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We live in the Information Age,1 an age in which we rely on 
computers and the Internet every day and in almost every aspect of our 
lives, from personal communications to business transactions to 
entertainment. Along with this constant use of computers and the 
Internet, however, comes a risk. In order to take advantage of the 
convenience which computers provide through online shopping and 
banking, for example, we must often provide our most personal 
information. Unfortunately, this personal information is not always 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Political Science, 2004, Northwestern University. I would like to 
thank my family for their continuous love and support. Thank you also to my peers 
in the SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW Honors Seminar for their invaluable help in writing 
this note. 
1 Glossary, Readiness for the Networked World, available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/readinessguide/glossary.html (defining Information Age 
as “the current stage in societal development which began to emerge at the end of the 
twentieth century” and is “marked by the increased production, transmission, 
consumption of and reliance on information.”). 
1
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completely secured by the database owners who store it. In exchange 
for the convenience of online dealings, therefore, we put ourselves at 
risk that our personal information will be wrongfully accessed. Since 
2005, there have been hundreds of publicized database security 
breaches, which have affected the personal data of more than two 
hundred million people.2 
With little legal precedent regarding liability surrounding database 
security breaches, there is great uncertainty as to who should bear the 
costs—consumers or database owners—associated with providing 
personal information for online transactions. Should consumers bear 
the costs in return for the conveniences of online transactions, or 
should database owners bear the costs in return for the opportunity to 
develop their business over the Internet? 
Consumers throughout the country who have been affected by 
database security breaches have begun to bring civil lawsuits against 
database owners to place liability on them for these breaches. The 
Seventh Circuit first dealt with such a situation in Pisciotta v. Old 
National Bancorp.3 The consumers in this case brought their action 
against the database owner under claims of negligence and breach of 
contract.4 The issue that the Seventh Circuit dealt with in examining 
these claims was whether the plaintiffs had suffered the requisite harm, 
considering their personal information was wrongfully accessed but no 
identity theft or other fraud resulted from the security breach.5 The 
Seventh Circuit was rather definitive in its ruling that the plaintiffs had 
not suffered the requisite harm to place liability on the database owner. 
Pisciotta, therefore, raises significant concerns for consumers. It also 
suggests important implications for the future of database security 
breach cases, which embody a new intersection of privacy law and tort 
law. 
                                                 
2 See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, available 
at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm. 
3 Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007). 
4 Id. at 632. 
5 Id. at 635. 
2
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This Note examines Pisciotta and its effect on the state of the law 
regarding liability resulting from database security breaches. Part I of 
this Note reviews the background necessary to discuss Pisciotta, 
which includes a basic understanding of the Internet, privacy law, and 
current regulations addressing database security breaches. Part II then 
examines Pisciotta, detailing the facts of the case and analyzing the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding. Part III explores whether Pisciotta could 
have come out differently, particularly had the court analogized the 
exposure of the plaintiffs’ personal information to toxic exposure in 
toxic tort cases. Part III also discusses the role of the economic loss 
doctrine in database security breach cases and whether it should have 
played a part in Pisciotta. Lastly, Part IV assesses what should be done 
to protect consumers’ privacy interests in light of the difficulties 
consumers face under current common law, as illustrated in Pisciotta. 
Specifically, this Note proposes that legislation be enacted to provide 
for the recovery of credit monitoring costs by affected consumers of a 
database security breach. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Pisciotta is particularly interesting because it illustrates a new 
intersection between privacy law and tort law in the context of 
technology. Considering this unique intersection of the law, one must 
have an understanding of certain technology, such as the Internet, as 
well as knowledge of privacy law and tort law, which are implicated 
because of this technology. This section provides this necessary 
background and also sheds light on federal and state regulations which 
address database security breaches. Through this background, one 
recognizes the lack of redress for victims of database security breaches 
whose personal information has been wrongfully accessed, but who 
have not yet suffered identity theft or other fraud. 
  
A.  What is the Internet? 
 
As described by some of its developers, “[t]he Internet has 
revolutionized the computer and communications world like nothing 
3
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before. . . The Internet is at once a world-wide broadcasting capability, 
a mechanism for information dissemination, and a medium for 
collaboration and interaction between individuals and their computers 
without regard for geographic location.”6  
The Internet was created in 1969 following years of research by 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of 
Defense.7 It essentially is a worldwide series of networks which can 
transmit data between each other using a special language called the 
Internet Protocol.8 One of the Internet’s most distinctive characteristics 
is that it is a “packet switching” network.9 This means that the Internet 
can break down information into packets, or formatted pieces of data, 
so that it can transmit the information as quickly and efficiently as 
capacity allows.10 Packets are labeled with the address of their final 
destination and may then travel through different routes until they 
reach their destination computer where they are reassembled.11 This 
differs from more traditional communication media, where 
information travels as a whole and may tie up an entire channel while 
it is transmitted.12 The Internet is also controlled through “smart 
communications” such that there is no centralized control of the 
Internet.13 Rather, all of the computers in the worldwide network 
assess the traffic of packets and control the flow of the information.14 
There is thus no central authority which governs who may use the 
Internet and for what purposes; it is an autonomous network.15 Lastly, 
                                                 
6 Barry M. Leiner, et. al., A Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society 
(2003), available at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml.  
7 Id.  
8 Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1097-1100 
(1996). 
9 Id. at 1097. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  
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the Internet provides for “telepresence,” meaning that the Internet is 
unconstrained by geography.16 A user may “access computers, retrieve 
information, or control various types of apparatus from around the 
world,” while his or her physical location is unidentifiable.17 This 
universe of international information that Internet users have access to 
is referred to as “cyberspace.”18 
The Internet was originally intended for use only by academics 
and government officials; however, the Internet became much more 
accessible with the development of personal home computers and 
“browser” software.19 Today the Internet is widely used by businesses 
and consumers and its use continues to grow exponentially. Electronic 
commerce or “e-commerce,” which includes the sale and purchase of 
products and services,20 has become a multi-billion dollar industry, 
with approximately 259 billion dollars of online sales having been 
expected in 2007.21  
Although the Internet provides consumers with many benefits, it 
also creates great concern for consumers who are required to provide 
personal information over the Internet for e-commerce transactions. 
These consumers face potential misuse of their information in several 
ways. For instance, consumers are susceptible to: the reuse of their 
information for purposes other than those for which they provided it; 
the replication of their information to third parties; the use of their 
information to commit fraud; the intrusive use of their information 
such as through telemarketing; and the interception or 
misappropriation of their information by third-party hacking, which 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1099. 
19 Christopher F. Carlton, The Right to Privacy in Internet Commerce: A Call 
for New Federal Guidelines and the Creation of an Independent Privacy 
Commission, 16 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 393, 401 (2002). 
20 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG, & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, 
INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 112 (2006). 
21 Online Sales Spike 19 Percent, CNNMoney.com (May 14, 2007), 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/14/news/economy/online_retailing/. 
5
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was at issue in Pisciotta.22 These examples of misuse of personal 
information which is provided over the Internet directly implicate the 
consumers’ right to privacy, which leads us to the next section 
regarding privacy law. 
 
B.  Privacy Law 
 
The concept of a right to privacy was first introduced in American 
jurisprudence by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their 
seminal article written in 1890, The Right to Privacy.23 They wrote, 
“[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of 
new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet 
the demands of society.”24 Particularly, the new right they espoused in 
this era of change, marked by the Industrial Revolution, was the “right 
to be let alone.”25 The article was embraced by jurists throughout the 
country, and courts began deciding cases by looking at different 
principles of privacy.26 This led to the creation of common law causes 
of action to protect an individual’s right to privacy through property, 
tort, and contract law.27 
The right of privacy came to the forefront of American 
jurisprudence again in the mid-twentieth century when the United 
States Supreme Court, through a series of decisions,28 established a 
constitutional right of privacy. Although the right of privacy is not 
                                                 
22 FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 6-7 (2001). 
23 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
24 Id. at 193. 
25 Id. Justice Louis Brandeis later wrote of “the right to be let alone” that it is 
“the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” 
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
26 Carlton, supra note 19, at 399. 
27 Id. 
28 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
6
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explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the Supreme Court found 
that the “roots of this right” were implied in the “‘penumbras’ and 
‘emanations’ of the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,”29 and 
particularly in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.30 
With the acceptance of the right of privacy in modern law, many 
scholars have devoted their research to exploring exactly which 
privacy interests are protected and to what extent. Professor Jerry 
Kang has described privacy in terms of being “clustered into three 
groupings”: privacy regarding 1) physical space, 2) decisions, and 3) 
information.31 This last grouping, information privacy, is most relevant 
in our discussion of the legal ramifications surrounding a database 
security breach. Information privacy “concerns an individual’s control 
over . . . the acquisition, disclosure, and use [] of personal 
information.”32 Personal information is “information identifiable to the 
individual,” meaning that it entails a connection between the 
information and the person, not necessarily that it is sensitive or 
private.33 Information may be identifiable to an individual when the 
information 1) is authored by the individual—i.e., phone conversation 
or e-mail, 2) describes the individual—i.e., birth date or mother’s 
maiden name, or 3) is “instrumentally mapped to the individual for 





                                                 
29 MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 8 (2007) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. 
479). 
30 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.  
31 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1193, 1202 (1998). 
32 Id. at 1203 (adopting this definition from a report by the Information 
Infrastructure Task Force which was created under the Clinton administration).  
33 Id. at 1206-1207.  
34 Id. at 1207. 
7
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1.  Privacy Torts 
 
Following Warren and Brandeis’s 1890 article, courts and 
legislatures recognized the “right to be let alone” through case law and 
statutory law.35 In 1960, Dean William Prosser cataloged the more 
than three hundred privacy tort cases that were decided since the 
Warren and Brandeis article, and concluded that there were four 
distinct privacy torts.36 These “invasion of privacy” torts have since 
been codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts37 as the following: 
1) intrusion upon seclusion—when one intrudes “upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns” and where this 
“intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person;”38 2) 
appropriation—when “one appropriates to his own use or benefit the 
name or likeness of another;”39 3) public disclosure of private facts—
when one publicly discloses a private matter that is “highly offensive 
to a reasonable person” and “is not of legitimate concern to the 
public;”40 and 4) false light—when one publicly discloses a matter that 
places a person “in a false light” that is “highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.”41  
These torts, however, provide little protection of personal 
information in the private sector.42 Particularly, they are not useful 
against database owners who merely store information which is then 
misappropriated, as was the case in Pisciotta. First, intrusion upon 
seclusion does not provide a remedy in this scenario. In the context of 
                                                 
35 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 18 
(2003). 
36 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
37 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977). 
38 Id. at § 652B. 
39 Id. at § 652C. 
40 Id. at § 652D. 
41 Id. at § 652E. 
42 Jerry Kang, supra note 31, at 1231 n.159. See Matthew C. Keck, Cookies, 
The Constitution, and the Common Law: A Framework for the Right of Privacy on 
the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 83 (2002) for an interesting proposal of a new 
tort to protect information privacy. 
8
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personal information, intrusion upon seclusion looks to whether the 
particular means used to collect the information is highly offensive.43 
This is not helpful in e-commerce situations, where consumers 
voluntarily provide information to receive goods or services; 44 there is 
no problem with the means the database owner uses to obtain that 
information. If any party has intruded upon seclusion in these 
situations, it is the third-party hacker; however, this is immaterial 
when a plaintiff seeks redress from the (wealthier) database owner.  
Second, a plaintiff can only sue a database owner under 
appropriation when the database owner itself uses or benefits from the 
name or likeness of the consumer. This practically would only occur 
when a database owner disseminates “personal information for 
commercial purposes without consent.”45 That is not the situation in a 
database security breach where a third party hacker has 
misappropriated the information without the knowledge of the 
database owner. Privacy concerns with the collection or storage of data 
are therefore largely outside the scope of appropriation.46 
Third, an action for public disclosure of private facts is unhelpful 
for a plaintiff under this scenario, because the tort entails that the 
information is distributed to the general public, not to an individual or 
small group of people,47 as is often the case in a database security 
breach. Furthermore, like intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure 
of private facts is not applicable when the plaintiff voluntarily 
provides information.48 Again, such an action may work against the 
third-party hacker if he or she distributes the information publicly, but 
will not work against the database owner. 
                                                 
43 Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or 
Frontier for Individual Rights? 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 222-23 (1992). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 225. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 224. 
48 Id. at 223-24. 
9
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Lastly, the false light tort is inapplicable in this context because it 
pertains only to the dissemination of inaccurate information;49 a 
database owner provides accurate information in a database security 
breach. As with public disclosure of private facts, the false light tort 
also requires that the information be disclosed to the public,50 not to a 
small group of people as occurs in most data breaches. A plaintiff 
could use this tort against the third-party hacker, for example, if the 
hacker publicly and fraudulently uses the plaintiff’s identity. 
Parties who seek to hold database owners liable for wrongful 
access to their personal information following a database breach thus 
have limited means to do so under common law. Without an applicable 
invasion of privacy tort, they must rely on claims of negligence and/or 
breach of contract, as in Pisciotta. Although the requisite duty for a 
negligence claim may be found through a contractual privacy policy or 
fiduciary relationship, claims under negligence and/or breach of 
contract remain very difficult to recover under because of the 
plaintiffs’ burden to prove a compensable injury, as we will see in 
Pisciotta. Recognizing the hurdles that consumers confront under 
common law to protect their information privacy, we now turn to what 
protection consumers have under federal and state regulation. 
 
2.  Federal Regulation 
 
The United States currently has no comprehensive legislation 
dealing with the collection of personal information. Consequently, 
information privacy has been protected through a “patchwork of 
Constitutional, statutory, common law and private sector guidelines,” 
which has often proven ineffective.51 Congress has passed some 
industry-specific statutes to control the use of personal information in 
reaction to particular industry and consumer interests; however, these 
                                                 
49 Id. at 224-25. 
50 Id. 
51 Seth Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Privacy in 
Cyberspace, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, ¶ 75 (2000). 
10
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statutes have not always been able to keep pace with advancing 
technology to protect consumers’ privacy rights.52 
Of some relevance in Pisciotta, which dealt with personal 
information provided to a bank, is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(“GLBA”).53 The GLBA states that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress 
that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing 
obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the 
security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal 
information.”54 The GLBA accordingly requires certain agencies, 
including the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities Exchange 
Commission, to “establish appropriate standards for the financial 
institutions subject to their jurisdiction” in order to 1) “insure the 
security and confidentiality of customer records and information;” 2) 
“protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or 
integrity of such records;” and 3) “protect against unauthorized access 
to or use of such records or information which could result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.”55 The GLBA 
further requires that financial institutions develop and give notice of 
their privacy policies to their customers at least annually.56 Before a 
financial institution may share personal information with certain 
nonaffiliated companies, it must also provide its customers with the 
ability to opt out of this disclosure.57 Although the GLBA is a move in 
the right direction for federal information privacy regulation, it does 
not create a private cause of action.58 Therefore, a customer cannot sue 
                                                 
52 Id. at ¶ 76. 
53 Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
6801-6809 (2000). 
54 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a). 
55 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b). 
56 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a). 
57 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b). 
58 Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort 
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 267 (2005). 
11
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a financial institution for breaching its duty to protect the customer’s 
personal information.59 
Although there is not much federal guidance on information 
privacy, particularly within the context of personal information stored 
on databases, there is evidence that Congress realizes the growing 
necessity to regulate this area. Specifically, there are a number of Bills 
which are currently working their way through the political process.60 
These include S. 239: Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act,61 
H.R. 958: Data Accountability and Trust Act,62 H.R. 836: Cyber-
Security Enhancement & Consumer Data Protection Act,63 and S. 495: 
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007.64 These Bills contain 
provisions which would establish requirements for data security65 and 
breach notification,66 criminalize concealment of data breaches,67 pre-
empt state laws,68 and delegate regulatory responsibility to the FTC.69 
Notably, however, none of these Bills provide for a private cause of 
action. 
 
3.  State Regulation 
 
Considering the lack of regulation at the federal level, many states 
have attempted to provide some guidance in regulating database 
                                                 
59 Id. 
60 See Scott Berinato, Data Breach Notification Laws, State by State, CSO, 
available at http://www.csoonline.com/read/020108/ammap/ammap.html. 
61 S. 239, 110th Cong. (2007). 
62 H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007). 
63 H.R. 836, 110th Cong. (2007). 
64 S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007). 
65 S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007). 
66 S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 239, 110th 
Cong. (2007); H.R. 836, 110th Cong. (2007). 
67 H.R. 836, 110th Cong. (2007). 
68 S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 239, 110th 
Cong. (2007); H.R. 836, 110th Cong. (2007). 
69 S. 239, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 495, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
12
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security. Most of these states have followed the lead of California, 
which has the strongest privacy law in the country.70 For example, as 
of January 2008, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have 
passed security breach notification laws,71 with California the first to 
enact such a law in 2003.72 Most security breach notification laws, as 
the one discussed in Pisciotta, require that companies which store 
personal information notify individuals in the event of a security 
breach where personal information is improperly accessed.73  
Security breach notification laws became common following the 
security breach of ChoicePoint, a data aggregation company, in 
2004.74 At that time, California was the only state to have a 
notification law, and ChoicePoint sent more than 30,000 letters to 
California residents informing them that their personal information 
had been improperly accessed.75 More than 145,000 consumers 
nationwide were affected by the breach though, many of whom were 
not notified of the breach due to lack of notification laws in their states 
of residence.76 This incident caused many states to question their 
privacy standards and to enact notification laws of their own.77  
Despite the states’ efforts to create some protection for consumers’ 
personal information through security breach notification statutes, 
consumers still have little means to ensure that their personal 
information is protected. Most of the notification statutes are 
extremely narrow in that they only create a duty to notify consumers 
of a security breach and do not expressly create a duty generally to 
protect data.78 Additionally, most of these statutes do not provide for 
                                                 
70 SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 227. 
71 See State Security Notification Laws, National Conference of State 
Legislatures, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm. 
72 Security Breach Information Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (2003). 
73 SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 228. 
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civil action by an affected consumer in the event that a database owner 
breaches its duties under the statute.79 The California notification 
statute is one of the few that both creates a data protection obligation 
and authorizes civil action for damages in this situation.80 
It is with this understanding of the limited protection of 
information privacy in the context of database security breaches, and 
the limited avenues for redress by affected consumers in these 
situations, that we examine Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp. 
 
II.  PISCIOTTA V. OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 
 
Luciano Pisciotta and Daniel Mills brought a class action on 
behalf of customers and potential customers of Old National Bancorp 
(“ONB”).81 They alleged that ONB failed to secure personal 
information which had been solicited through ONB’s website from 
applicants for banking services.82 Depending on the service requested, 
customers or potential customers would provide their name, address, 
Social Security number, driver’s license number, date of birth, 
mother’s maiden name, and credit card or other financial account 
numbers over the website.83 In 2005, as a result of ONB’s failed 
security, a third-party computer hacker gained access to this private 
information of tens of thousands of people who used ONB’s website.84 
The security breach was found to be “sophisticated, intentional and 
malicious.”85 ONB sent written notice to its customers of the intrusion, 
once it was notified by the hosting facility, NCR.86 
                                                 
79 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3075 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-
101 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(10) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 75-65(d) (2005).  
80 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.81.5, 1798.84(b). 




85 Id. at 632. 
86 Id. 
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A.  Procedural History 
 
The plaintiffs brought an action in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Indiana, having jurisdiction under the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.87 They alleged negligence claims 
against ONB and NCR, as well as breach of implied contract against 
ONB and breach of contract against NCR.88 They alleged that they 
suffered “substantial potential economic damages and emotional 
distress and worry that third parties [would] use [the plaintiffs’] 
confidential personal information to cause them economic harm, or 
sell their confidential information to others who [would] in turn cause 
them economic harm.”89 The plaintiffs did not, however, claim any 
“completed direct financial loss” nor that any member of the class 
“already had been the victim of identity theft” because of the security 
breach.90 The plaintiffs sought damages in the form of compensation 
for past and future credit monitoring costs.91 
The district court granted NCR’s motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, leaving ONB as the sole defendant.92 ONB moved for 
judgment on the pleadings and opposed the plaintiffs’ motion for class 
certification.93 The district court ruled in favor of ONB on both 
motions, concluding that “the plaintiffs’ claims failed as a matter of 
law because ‘they have not alleged that ONB’s conduct caused them 
cognizable injury,’” where “under Indiana law, damages must be more 
                                                 
87 Id. at 633. Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d), the district court had jurisdiction over the case because at least one member 
of the proposed class was a citizen of a state different from ONB (the class members 
included residents of Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee) 
and the matter in controversy exceeded five million dollars, exclusive of interest and 
costs. 
88 Pisciotta, 499 F.3d 629, at 632. 
89 Id. (citing R.37 at 2). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 631. 
92 Id. at 632. 
93 Id. 
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than speculative.”94 Furthermore, the district court concluded that 
compensation for the cost of credit monitoring could not be an 
“‘alternative award for what would otherwise be speculative and 
unrecoverable damages,’” as the cost to monitors one’s credit is, “‘not 
the result of any present injury, but rather the anticipation of the future 
injury that has not yet materialized.’”95 
The plaintiffs appealed the judgment for ONB on the negligence 
and breach of implied contract claims to the Seventh Circuit, and also 
requested that the Seventh Circuit vacate the order denying class 
certification.96 
 
B.  Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
In an opinion written by Judge Ripple, the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the 
damages of past and future credit monitoring costs sought by the 
plaintiffs were not compensable under Indiana law.97 Therefore, claims 
for negligence and breach of implied contract failed as a matter of 
law.98 The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de 
novo because it was based on a 12(c) motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.99 
 
1.  A Quick Look at Jurisdiction 
 
Having found jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, the court went on to review its subject matter jurisdiction over 
the case.100 In an interesting precursor to its discussion on the merits, 
the court noted that many federal courts (including those that the 
                                                 
94 Id. (citing R.78 at 3). 
95 Id. (citing R.78 at 3-4). 
96 Id. at 633. 
97 Id. at 640. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 633. 
100 Id. at 633-34. 
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district court relied on in its reasoning) concluded that they did not 
have jurisdiction in similar cases where the plaintiffs’ data had been 
compromised but not yet misused, because these plaintiffs had not met 
the injury-in-fact requirement for standing under Article III.101 The 
court went on to say, however, that the injury-in-fact requirement of 
Article III could be “satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act 
which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm 
that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s 
actions.” Therefore, the court reasoned, it had jurisdiction over the 
matter.102 In its following discussion, however, the court concluded 
that this potential harm, which was enough to confer standing, was not 
enough to bring a successful claim for negligence or breach of implied 
contract.103 
 
2.  Was There Requisite Harm? 
 
The main issue in Pisciotta was whether “the harm caused by 
identity information exposure, coupled with the attendant costs to 
guard against identity theft, constitutes an existing compensable injury 
and consequent damages required to state a claim for negligence or for 
breach of contract.”104 Stemming from this issue was the more general 
question of whether Indiana would recognize a cause of action for a 
data exposure injury,105 a question with substantial ramifications under 
Indiana law, considering it had never been addressed.  
Because the case was brought under diversity jurisdiction and 
alleged causes of action under Indiana law, the court was required to 
apply the substantive law of Indiana.106 As stated above, however, 
there was no Indiana precedent addressing the issue at hand.107 
                                                 
101 Id. at 634. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 640. 
104 Id. at 635. 
105 Id. at 636. 
106 Id. at 634. 
107 Id. at 635. 
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Therefore, the court was required to examine the case based on its 
prediction of how the Supreme Court of Indiana would decide it.108 To 
do this, the court considered 1) Indiana legislation on the issue,109      
2) Indiana case law regarding analogous areas of the law,110 and 3) the 
reasoning of other courts applying the law of other jurisdictions, but 
on the same legal issue.111 Although the Seventh Circuit would look at 
this range of sources for guidance, it emphasized that it would take a 
restrictive approach to this “novel theory of liability.”112 The court 
asserted, “Without state authority to guide us, ‘[w]hen given a choice 
between an interpretation of [state] law which reasonably restricts 
liability, and one which greatly expands liability, we should choose the 
narrower and more reasonable path.’”113 
 
a.  Indiana Legislation 
 
In deciding whether the plaintiffs had suffered the requisite harm 
for a successful negligence or breach of contract claim, the court first 
looked at Indiana legislation on the matter.114 Specifically, it examined 
a statute which was enacted on March 21, 2006 and imposes certain 
duties on private entities (as well as state agencies) if their databases 
which contain personal information are accessed by unauthorized third 
parties.115 The statute, in effect, is one of notification, requiring a 
database owner who knows or should know of a security breach to 
notify all potentially affected consumers of that breach.116 It further 
requires the database owner to provide information to each consumer 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 636-37. 
110 Id. at 637-39. 
111 Id. at 639-40. 
112 Id. at 636. 
113 Id. at 635-36 (quoting Todd v. Societe Vic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1412 (7th 
Cir 1994)). 
114 Id. at 636-37. 
115 Id. at 636 (citing I.C. § 24-4.9 et seq.). 
116 Id. at 637 n.6. 
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reporting agency, where the breach potentially affects more than one 
thousand consumers.117 It is interesting to note that the court 
recognized that the statute took effect on July 1, 2006, after the 
incident involved in Pisciotta, and thus was not directly relevant to the 
case.118 Nonetheless, the court looked at the statute for guidance on 
how the Indiana Supreme Court would rule on the matter.119 
The Seventh Circuit noted that the Indiana statute requires no 
affirmative act other than notification, and that if the database owner 
fails to notify, enforcement actions may only be taken by the Attorney 
General of Indiana.120 The court concluded, therefore, that the 
legislation creates no private right of action by a consumer against the 
database owner, and likewise creates “no duty to compensate affected 
individuals for inconvenience or potential harm to credit.”121 
Significantly, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute 
is evidence of the Indiana legislature’s belief that an individual has 
suffered a compensable injury when his or her personal information is 
wrongfully acquired by a third party in a security breach.122 Rather, the 
court concluded that the Indiana legislature would have made a 
definite statement of its intent to create a cause of action in such a 
situation.123 
Having found no support for the plaintiffs’ allegations in light of 
Indiana legislation, the court then turned to Indiana case law dealing 





                                                 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 636-37. 
119 Id. 




124 Id. at 637-39. 
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b.  Indiana Case Law 
 
The plaintiffs argued that there was Indiana case law in analogous 
settings acknowledging that banks have a special duty to prevent 
disclosure of their customers’ private information.125 They further 
argued that Indiana courts recognized that failure to perform this duty 
could result in harm to customers.126 The court quickly dismissed 
these arguments, stating that the cases presented by the plaintiffs were 
of “marginal assistance” because the facts of the cases were not 
similar enough to the facts of the instant case.127 Specifically, the court 
distinguished the cases cited by the plaintiffs by noting that the 
plaintiffs in those cases were compensated for harm from injuries to 
their reputation that were “direct and immediate,” whereas the 
plaintiffs in Pisciotta sought compensation for “guarding against some 
future, anticipated harm.”128 
After dismissing the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding analogous 
case law, the court, on its own, examined the possibly analogous case 
law of toxic tort liability.129 In this setting, the court was able to find 
precedent from the Supreme Court of Indiana implying that 
“compensable damage requires more than an exposure to a future 
potential harm.”130 It explained further that even courts allowing 
medical monitoring damages, those being damages to monitor harm 
after toxic exposure, showed doubt that there should be an allowance 
for credit monitoring damages.131 Moreover, no Indiana courts were 
                                                 
125 Id. at 637-38. 
126 Id. The plaintiffs cited Ind. Nat’l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1985) and Am. Fletcher Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 252 N.E.2d 839 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1969). 
127 Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 638. 
128 Id. 
129 The court, however, was careful to qualify this argument, stating that it did 
not have to “endorse this analogy for present purposes.” Id. at 639. 
130 Id. at 638-639 (citing Allied Signal, Inc. v. Ott, 785 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. 
2003)). 
131 Id. at 639 (citing the Southern District of Ohio in Kahle v. Litton Loan 
Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (S.D. Ohio 2007)). 
20
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among those allowing medical monitoring damages.132 In fact, the 
court contended that by looking at the Supreme Court of Indiana’s 
treatment of toxic tort liability, it seemed that the Supreme Court of 
Indiana actually “supports the view that no cause of action for credit 
monitoring is available.”133 
Again, having found no support for the plaintiffs’ cause of action, 
and with no other authority from Indiana law, the Seventh Circuit 
proceeded to examine the reasoning of other courts applying the law 
of other jurisdictions, but to the same legal issue presented in 
Pisciotta. 
 
c.  Case Law From Other Jurisdictions 
 
The court listed a number of district court cases, including from 
districts in Ohio, Minnesota, Arizona, and Michigan, where plaintiffs 
with similar allegations to those in Pisciotta were denied damages 
because they had not suffered the requisite harm.134 The court 
concluded by stating that it would not “adopt a ‘substantive 
innovation’ in state law or ‘[] invent what would be a truly novel tort 
claim’ on behalf of the state absent some authority to suggest that the 
approval of the Supreme Court of Indiana is forthcoming.” 135 This 
was particularly in light of the fact that the plaintiffs had not brought 
forth any case or statute authorizing the cause of action they sought 
recovery under.136 
                                                 
132 Id. 
133 Id. (citing Allied Signal, 785 N.E.2d 1068). 
134 Id. (citing Kahle, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 712-13; Hendricks v. DSW Shoe 
Warehouse, 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (W.D. Mich. 2006); Guin v. Brazos Higher 
Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4846 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 
2006); Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. 03-0185, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 41054 (D. Ariz. Sept. 8, 2005)). 
135 Id. at 640 (quoting Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 
2004) and Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 607 (7th Cir. 2000); and 
citing Birchler v. Gehl Co., 88 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1996) and Ry Express 
Agency, Inc. v. Super Scale Models, Ltd., 934 F.2d 135, 138 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
136 Id. at 639-40. 
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III.  COULD PISCIOTTA HAVE COME OUT DIFFERENTLY? 
 
The Seventh Circuit made clear in Pisciotta that it would not 
recognize a claim to recover past and future credit monitoring 
damages from a database owner following a database security breach, 
where the only harm suffered was the wrongful access of the plaintiffs’ 
personal information, and where no identity theft or other fraud 
resulted. Despite the Seventh Circuit’s definite language in reaching 
this conclusion, it is valuable to explore whether Pisciotta could have 
come out differently for the plaintiff consumers (and consequently for 
similarly situated consumers in future cases). In particular, we look at 
whether the plaintiffs could have recovered by analogizing their injury 
to that suffered in a toxic tort claim. We also look at whether the court 
could have disregarded the economic loss doctrine, which limits 
economic recovery in negligence actions. Through this analysis, we 
recognize that a favorable result for the plaintiffs was possible in 
theory, but not in practice. Plaintiffs therefore need to look to new 
legislation, as discussed in Part IV, in order to recover credit 
monitoring damages in these situations. 
 
A.  Analogizing to Toxic Tort Liability 
 
An interesting argument that the plaintiffs in Pisciotta failed to 
make, but that the Seventh Circuit raised on its own, was whether an 
injury could be found by analogizing data breach liability to toxic tort 
liability.137 Multiple state and federal courts have allowed victims of 
toxic exposure, without proof of further injury caused by the exposure, 
to recover medical monitoring damages.138 If the analogy between 
                                                 
137 Id. at 638-39. 
138 Johnson, supra note 58, at 307-08 (citing Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. 
Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Witherspoon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
964 F. Supp. 455, 467 (D.D.C. 1997); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the 
Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. 1997);Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 836 
P.2d 795, 824-25 (Cal. 1993)). See also, In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 
829 (3d Cir. 1990); Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 
F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Patton v. Gen. Signal Corp., 984 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. 
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toxic exposure and exposure of personal information to identity theft is 
accepted, it follows that these courts could also allow for the recovery 
of credit monitoring damages.  
The analogy is as follows: a consumer who loses personal 
information due to a database security breach is like a person who 
suffers exposure to a toxic substance in that both risk greater harm to 
their person as a result of this occurrence.139 In the case of toxic 
exposure, the exposed party has increased chances of having a disease, 
while in the case of a database security breach, the exposed consumer 
has increased chances of falling victim to identity theft and fraud.140 In 
either case, the victim of the exposure is in the best position to 
mitigate future harm by, in the least, monitoring the risk of the future 
harm.141 
In theory, because there was no Indiana authority on awarding 
credit monitoring damages, the Seventh Circuit could have looked at 
other jurisdictions, including those that have accepted medical 
monitoring damages, and used this authority to support a finding for 
credit monitoring damages under Indiana law. The Supreme Court of 
Indiana, however, had spoken to the issue of awarding damages in a 
toxic exposure case.142 The Supreme Court of Indiana ruled in Allied 
Signal, Inc. v. Ott that “no compensable injury occurs at the time of 
[toxic] exposure.”143 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit was constrained to 
this ruling. Although other states have allowed medical monitoring 
                                                                                                                   
N.Y. 1997); Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 876 F. Supp. 475 (W.D. N.Y. 
1995); Bocook v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 819 F. Supp 530 (S.D. W. Va. 1993); Bower v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 522 S.E. 2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999); Bourgeois v. 
A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So.2d 355 (La. 1998); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 
232 (Pa. 1996); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993); 
Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A. 2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993); Ayers v. Jackson Twp., 
525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App. 
1987). 
139 Johnson, supra note 58, at 308. 
140 Id.  
141 Id. 
142 Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 639 (citing Allied Signal, Inc. v. Ott, 785 N.E.2d 
1068 (Ind. 2003)). 
143 Id. (citing Allied Signal, 785 N.E.2d at 1075). 
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damages, Indiana is not one of them.144 Therefore, even if the Seventh 
Circuit found the analogy to be apt, which it did not take a position on, 
it would be forced to conclude that credit monitoring damages were 
not available following a database security breach, just as medical 
monitoring damages were not available following toxic exposure.145  
Still, this leaves the door open for actions seeking credit 
monitoring damages brought to the Seventh Circuit under other states’ 
laws. For example, it remains largely unsettled in Illinois whether 
medical monitoring damages are available without physical injury.146 
Therefore, it is possible, though still rather unlikely, that the Seventh 
Circuit could recognize credit monitoring damages in a case brought 
under Illinois law, if the court accepted the analogy to medical 
monitoring damages. 
 
B.  Economic Loss Doctrine 
 
The plaintiffs in Pisciotta also could have made the argument that 
the standard for proving compensable injury should have been 
broadened in the context of a database security breach because the 
economic loss doctrine, which effectively narrows the standard, is not 
implicated in this context. The economic loss doctrine states that in 
order for a plaintiff to recover economic losses resulting from a 
defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff must have suffered physical harm 
to his or her person or property.147 This doctrine, although having its 
roots in product liability, is applicable in most negligence cases and 
may effectively limit recovery in tort cases involving internet security, 
as implicitly illustrated in Pisciotta. The concept of physical harm to 
                                                 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 639 n.10. 
146 Guillory v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 97 C 8641, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3353 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2001); Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. LLC, No. 96 C 8583, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16232 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1999); Campbell v. A.C. Equip. Servs. 
Corp., Inc., 610 N.E.2d 745, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
147 See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); 
Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965) (Chief Justice Roger Traynor is 
credited with first articulating the doctrine in this landmark decision). 
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one’s person or property is a questionable one though in the context of 
cybertorts, and it is for this reason that we need to evaluate the purpose 
and value of the economic loss doctrine in this context. 
The economic loss doctrine has three significant functions: 1) to 
protect a defendant from a disproportionately wide range of liability,148 
2) to ensure that damages are proven with certainty, and 3) to define a 
doctrinal boundary between tort and contract law.149 If one looks only 
at the damages requested in Pisciotta, the costs of credit monitoring, 
one realizes that the functions of the economic loss doctrine are not 
met. The doctrine is thus an unnecessary limitation on recovery in this 
context.  
First, the scope of liability in Pisciotta is not in question. Limiting 
the scope of a defendant’s liability is certainly crucial in tort law, 
considering that “acts of negligence often have extremely broad 
adverse economic consequences.”150 This is also the reason why most 
jurisdictions require proof of proximate causation in a negligence 
action. A defendant otherwise could be sued by parties having almost 
no relation to the negligent act. In Pisciotta, however, the plaintiffs 
were all customers or potential customers of ONB who had provided 
ONB with personal information.151 It was consequently the 
information of these plaintiffs that was stolen through the security 
breach of ONB’s database.152 As such, the liability of the defendant is 
restricted to ONB’s customers.  
Second, the plaintiffs in Pisciotta could prove their requested 
damages with certainty. This is not a situation where the court must 
calculate lost economic opportunity, a situation that the economic loss 
doctrine most directly addresses under this function. By requiring that 
damages be proven with reasonable certainty, the economic loss 
doctrine not only ensures that defendants not pay for speculative 
                                                 
148 See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic 
Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1533 (1985). 
149 Johnson, supra note 58, at 296. 
150 Id. at 296-97. 
151 Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2007). 
152 Id.  
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amounts, it also “promotes judicious use of limited judicial resources, 
ensuring that those scarce assets are not squandered on the 
burdensome, and perhaps dubious, task of trying to quantify endless 
economic losses that may, in truth, not be provable with reasonable 
precision.”153 In Pisciotta, however, the plaintiffs would merely need 
to present receipts or online invoices showing the cost of past and, to 
the extent reasonable, future credit monitoring services they used or 
would use following the security breach of ONB’s database. One can 
go to the website of almost any credit monitoring service provider and 
find the price for services, which generally range from ten to fifteen 
dollars per individual per month.154 Therefore, damages could be 
limited to this amount, protecting ONB from paying mere speculative 
amounts. 
Lastly, as argued by Professor Vincent Johnson, providing a 
plaintiff with the costs of credit monitoring after a database security 
breach, as requested in Pisciotta, would not pose a problem in 
delineating between tort and contract law.155 Professor Johnson 
explains that the protection of personal information in databases 
should not be an area of bargaining between consumers and database 
owners.156 The majority of states, through their data breach 
notification statutes, seem to support this idea.157 Even though 
database owners may have privacy policies that must be accepted by 
consumers, consumers should not be able to contract out of their right 
to sue for credit monitoring costs through these policies. Furthermore, 
plaintiffs arguing breach of contract in these situations would likely be 
unable to recover credit monitoring costs if they were not expressly 
contracted for, because they would be considered consequential 
damages, which are generally difficult to recover if not contemplated 
                                                 
153 Johnson, supra note 58, at 297-98 (citing Vincent R. Johnson & Alan Gunn, 
STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 7, 9 (3d ed. 2005)). 
154 See, e.g., http://www.equifax.com/credit-product-list/; 
http://www.truecredit.com; http://www.identityguard.com. 
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at the time of contract formation.158 Rather, tort law is better equipped 
to provide for recovery of the cost of credit monitoring, where 
compensation would depend on the reasonableness of these costs in 
the context of each case.159  
In all, the plaintiffs in Pisciotta could have argued that courts 
should not be limited by the economic loss doctrine when deciding 
whether plaintiffs have suffered the requisite compensable injury in a 
data security breach case where the consequent damages are the cost 
of credit monitoring, because the functions of the economic loss 
doctrine are not implicated in this context. Nonetheless, considering 
that the Seventh Circuit traditionally has espoused the economic loss 
doctrine, with Judge Posner as one of its strongest advocates,160 this 
argument would not ensure the plaintiffs in Pisciotta recovery of credit 
monitoring costs. 
 
IV.  WHERE DO CONSUMERS GO FROM HERE? 
 
Following Pisciotta, it is clear that the Seventh Circuit is not 
willing to find a common law cause of action under tort law, at least in 
Indiana, to provide credit monitoring costs to consumers who have lost 
personal information due to a database security breach. The court 
noted in Pisciotta that allowing for recovery of credit monitoring costs 
after a security breach would constitute a “substantive innovation” in 
state law, and the court justifiably refused to do this.161 In the short 
time since Pisciotta was decided, it has already been followed by a 
district court in the Fifth Circuit,162 having ruled that consumers need 
to prove more than wrongful access to their personal information to 
                                                 
158 Id. at 301 n.307. 
159 Id. at 301. 
160 See Miller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1990); Rardin v. T & 
D Mach. Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Thomas J. Miles, 
Posner on Economic Loss in Tort: EVRA Corp v Swiss Bank, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1813 (2007); Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and 
Legal Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 735 (2006). 
161 Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 640 (7th Cir. 2007). 
162 Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 793 (M.D. La. 2007). 
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recover under tort law, and that credit monitoring costs are thus not 
compensable damages.163 As noted above, there are also other district 
courts, including in Ohio,164 Minnesota,165 Arizona,166 and Michigan167 
which decided, prior to Pisciotta, that credit monitoring costs are not 
recoverable after a database security breach. Although there is thus 
reason to believe that consumers in many states will not be able to 
recover credit monitoring costs through common law when the 
consumers’ personal information is wrongfully accessed, the issue 
remains whether consumers should be able to recover credit 
monitoring costs despite the court decisions. If so, their best prospect 
for recovery is through new legislation.  
 
A.  Why Require Credit Monitoring Services? 
 
Legislatures should require that database owners offer credit 
monitoring services to all consumers whose personal information has 
been wrongfully accessed due to a database security breach. This 
would be advantageous to database owners as well as consumers. 
In 2007, the average cost to a database owner following a 
database security breach by a third-party hacker was $231 per 
compromised record (this cost is even greater for financial institutions 
where consumers have higher expectations of security).168 The cost of 
lost business due to customer turnover accounted for about 56% of this 
total cost, and the cost of providing credit monitoring accounted for 
only 1%.169 One must note that even though a database owner may 
                                                 
163 Id. at 797. 
164 Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
165 Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. 05-668, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4846 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006). 
166 Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. 03-0185, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 41054 (D. Ariz. Sept. 8, 2005). 
167 Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, 444 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D. Mich. 
2006). 
168 2007 Annual Study: U.S. Cost of a Data Breach (study by the Ponemon 
Institute, LLC) (Nov. 2007). 
169 Id. 
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offer credit monitoring services, only about five to thirty percent of the 
affected consumers actually exercises this offer, which translates to the 
database owner’s cost.170 Therefore, a database owner’s greatest 
concern following a security breach is the loss of customers.  
By requiring that database owners provide credit monitoring 
services, consumers may be more sympathetic to the database owners 
(particularly in the case of a breach by a third-party hacker) and thus 
give a second thought to transferring their business. Furthermore, by 
offering credit monitoring services, database owners could potentially 
save future legal costs related to a security breach. Many companies 
already voluntarily provide affected consumers with credit monitoring 
after database security breaches, recognizing the potential liability if 
such monitoring does not take place.171 After all, credit monitoring 
decreases affected consumers’ risks of falling victim to identity theft 
and other fraud. Providing for credit monitoring services, though less 
of a cost than other potential liability, would still be a considerable 
expense for database owners, and therefore would also create an 
incentive for these owners to increase database security. With this 
increase in security, database owners will likely see an increase in their 
online business because consumers will feel that their personal 
information is being better protected.  
For affected consumers, such legislation would at least provide 
compensation for out-of-pocket expenses. As seen in Pisciotta, 
consumers face an up-hill battle in protecting information privacy 
through common law. Unless they are victims of identity theft or other 
actual fraud, consumers will have significant difficulty receiving even 
those out-of-pocket expenses through a negligence or breach of 
contract action considering, among other difficulties, the high standard 
of proving a compensable injury. Affected consumers of a database 
security breach may also find it difficult in a negligence action, for 
                                                 
170 Bob Sullivan, Few Takers for Free Credit Monitoring, MSNBC (April 20, 
2006) available at http://redtape.msnbc.com/2006/04/few_takers_for_.html. 
171 John B. Kennedy & Anne E. Kennedy, What Went Wrong? What Went 
Right? Corporate Responses to Privacy and Security Breaches, PLI: Patents, 
Copyrights, Trademarks, and literary Property Course Handbook Series, 61-62 
(2007). 
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example, to prove proximate causation, because the intentionally 
tortious or criminal conduct of a hacker may break the chain of 
causation, thus absolving the database owner of liability.172 As stated 
above, requiring database owners to provide credit monitoring services 
following a database breach will also likely improve database security, 
which surely is advantageous for consumers providing personal 
information online. 
 
B.  Other Proposed Legislation 
 
Professor Vincent Johnson proposes legislation which would 
allow consumers to recover credit monitoring costs when their 
personal information is wrongfully accessed, provided that these credit 
monitoring costs are a limitation on a database owner’s liability.173 The 
fact that most states have enacted security breach notification statutes 
illustrates that there is a recognized privacy interest in the personal 
information provided to the database owners.174 In practice, however, 
the notification statutes provide limited protection, because many of 
these statutes do not ensure that affected consumers receive the most 
expedient notice which is crucial in minimizing harm following a 
security breach.175 Database owners are generally only obligated to 
notify consumers of a database breach upon actual discovery or 
notification of the breach, when in reality they may be able to discover 
the breach earlier, yet have no incentive to do so.176 By introducing 
credit monitoring costs as a statutory remedy and a limitation on 
liability, database owners will have an incentive to discover security 
breaches as early as possible so as to shift liability to the consumer as 
early as possible.177 Once a database owner notifies an affected 
                                                 
172 Johnson, supra note 58, at 309 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 448 
(1965)). 
173 Id. at 306. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 306-07. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (2003). 
176 Johnson, supra note 58, at 306. 
177 Id. at 307. 
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consumer of a security breach, the database owner would only be 
liable for credit monitoring costs from that point and for no other 
liabilities resulting from the security breach.  
The advantages for database owners and for consumers are, for 
the most part, the same as those from legislation without a cap on 
liability. For database owners, however, limiting liability to credit 
monitoring costs is even more advantageous than simply requiring 
credit monitoring costs because it would necessarily prevent 
devastating liability from subsequent legal actions.178 Without this cap, 
their risk of liability is merely decreased.  
Consumers, on the other hand, do face the disadvantage of not 
being able to bring a negligence claim against the database owner once 
they have actually suffered financial injury through identity theft or 
fraud. On the whole, however, the majority of affected consumers will 
not fall victim to identity theft or fraud, and would prefer some redress 
following a security breach than none. Furthermore, with free credit 
monitoring services, consumers should be less likely to fall victim to 





Pisciotta is a fascinating case because it highlights the difficulties 
plaintiffs face when the law does not necessarily keep up with the 
advancement of technology. Indeed, Pisciotta presented the Seventh 
Circuit with an issue it had never faced: whether the costs of credit 
monitoring spent by consumers whose personal information was 
wrongfully accessed through a database security breach, but who were 
not victims of identity theft or fraud, are compensable damages and 
thus recoverable under a negligence or breach of contract action. The 
Seventh Circuit was unwilling to extend the definition of compensable 
damages to the costs of credit monitoring in this situation, and 
definitively refused to create a common law cause of action for such 
damages. 
                                                 
178 Id. at 309. 
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Following Pisciotta then, individuals in Indiana whose personal 
information is wrongfully accessed because of a database security 
breach effectively have no avenue of redress unless they fall victim to 
identity theft or other fraud. Although this is a rather narrow reading of 
Pisciotta, it can easily be broadened to encompass other states in the 
Seventh Circuit and even beyond the Seventh Circuit because of the 
similar state of the law regarding database security breaches. Most 
states have security breach notification laws, but do not require 
database owners to provide affected consumers with credit monitoring 
services. If other circuits follow the Seventh Circuit in refusing credit 
monitoring damages, there will not only be lack of redress through 
regulation, but lack of redress through the common law. Consumers 
therefore need to rely on their legislators to create statutory credit 
monitoring damages, if they are to receive them at all. 
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